Marquette University Law School

Marquette Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1-1-2009

When May a Court Set Aside a National Railroad
Adjustment Board Decision on Due Process
Grounds?
Jay E. Grenig
Marquette University Law School, jay.grenig@marquette.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub
Part of the Law Commons
Publication Information
Jay E. Grenig, When May a Court Set Aside a National Railroad Adjustment Board Decision on Due
Process Grounds?, 37 Preview U.S. Sup. Ct. Cas. 57 (2009). © 2009 American Bar Association. This
information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means
or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written
consent of the American Bar Association.
Repository Citation
Grenig, Jay E., "When May a Court Set Aside a National Railroad Adjustment Board Decision on Due Process Grounds?" (2009).
Faculty Publications. Paper 454.
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub/454

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

A R B I T R A T I O N

When May a Court Set Aside a
National Railroad Adjustment Board
Decision on Due Process Grounds?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 57–61. © 2009 American Bar Association.

gating officer or superintendent of
Union Pacific. In each case, the
hearings were recorded and transcribed with exhibits attached.
Union Pacific declined each of the
claims. The parties then met in a
conference in a last-chance effort to
settle the case. When those efforts
failed, and the Brotherhood did not
prevail, it sent letters of intent to
the National Railroad Adjustment
Board (NRAB) to initiate arbitration
proceedings.

Jay E. Grenig is a professor of
law at Marquette University
Law School in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. He is the author of
Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ThomsonReuters/West) and a
member of the National Academy
of Arbitrators. He can be reached
at jgrenig@earthlink.net
or 414.288.5377.

In its original submission, the
Brotherhood included the onproperty record containing the
notices of discipline, the hearing
transcript, all the exhibits, and all
the evidence used in the grievance
procedure relating to the merits of
the underlying discharge or discipline. The Brotherhood did not,
however, include any written documentation that the parties had met
in conference. Union Pacific raised
no objection to the Brotherhood’s
submission and, in due course, presented its own countersubmission
on the merits of the dispute. It did

ISSUE
Does the Railway Labor Act
allow a court to set aside on due
process grounds a National Railroad
Adjustment Board decision dismissing five employees’ grievance
claims contesting their discipline
or discharge?

FACTS
In 2000 and 2001, petitioner Union
Pacific Railroad Co. discharged or
disciplined five locomotive engineers. The Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers and
Trainmen filed grievances in accordance with the Railway Labor Act
(RLA) seeking reinstatement, back
pay, and removal of the discipline
for the five engineers. The
Brotherhood then proceeded
through the “on-property” process
in the manner dictated by the collective bargaining agreement
between the parties.

(Continued on Page 58)

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. V.
BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE
ENGINEERS AND TRAINMEN
DOCKET NO. 08-604
ARGUMENT DATE:
OCTOBER 7, 2009
FROM: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Each aggrieved party had an onproperty hearing before an investi57

Case
at a
Glance
The Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers
and Trainmen brought an
action under the Railway
Labor Act to vacate
decisions by the National
Railroad Adjustment
Board dismissing
employee claims. The
board had dismissed the
complaints because the
Brotherhood did not
provide proof it had
complied with a
“conferencing” in its
initial submission to
the board.

not mention the Brotherhood’s failure to include evidence that a conference had occurred.
After the parties filed their submissions, they met on March 15, 2005,
for a hearing before an arbitration
panel of the NRAB. Each arbitration
panel of the NRAB consists of an
equal number of members chosen
by the carrier and by the labor organization. When the panels are deadlocked, a neutral person known as a
referee sits with the panel to make
an award. As a practical matter,
the referee usually determines the
outcome.
Just before the start of the oral
argument, Union Pacific’s panel representative requested an executive
session of the panel, out of the presence of the Brotherhood’s representative. During that session, Union
Pacific’s representative informed the
referee that the Brotherhood’s submission to the board did not contain
any evidence of conferencing.
Without such evidence, Union
Pacific argued, the board must draw
the inference that the conferences
had not occurred. Union Pacific did
not argue that conferencing had not
occurred (as conferencing had in
fact taken place), only that the
Brotherhood had failed to offer any
evidence of it in the on-property
record submitted to the board.
The Brotherhood’s advocate offered
to submit documentation that the
conferences had occurred. The referee gave the Brotherhood time to
do that. The Brotherhood eventually
proffered proof that a conference
had occurred, which included
phone logs, informal notes, and other documents. A majority of the
panel voted not to allow this later
submitted evidence. The majority
voted to dismiss all five employee
appeals for lack of jurisdiction.

without evidence in the on-property
record that the conference had
occurred, it had no jurisdiction to
consider the Brotherhood’s claims.
The NRAB further concluded that it
could not consider evidence not
contained in the on-property
record. The Brotherhood’s representative filed a dissent in each of the
five awards.
The Brotherhood then sought
review in the district court of all five
of these identically reasoned
awards. Union Pacific argued that
the NRAB’s decisions were evidentiary rulings that could not be set
aside absent misconduct or bad
faith by the arbitrator. The railroad
then sought to convince the district
court that the conference is a
mandatory precursor to arbitration
and that without written evidence of
the conference—evidence that
could not be added to the record
later—the NRAB had no jurisdiction
to hear the claim.
The union countered that neither
federal law nor the collective bargaining agreement required conferencing and that even if conferencing
were required, no rule dictated that
conferencing must be proved by evidence in the on-property record.
The Brotherhood argued that the
NRAB had failed to conform to its
jurisdiction and had violated due
process.
In the end, the district court concluded that conferencing is required
before parties can refer their disputes to the NRAB. 432 F. Supp. 2d
768 (N.D. Ill. 2006). It found that
the NRAB had not violated due
process by refusing to consider evidence of conferencing outside of the
on-property record. Consequently,
the district court dismissed the
Brotherhood’s suit, concluding that
the union had failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.

In the five nearly identical decisions, the NRAB concluded that,
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On appeal to the Seventh Circuit,
the Brotherhood did not challenge
the district court’s holding that the
RLA requires conferencing. Instead
it focused on whether the NRAB
denied due process and had failed to
act within the scope of its jurisdiction by requiring proof of conferencing in the on-property record.
A three-judge panel of the Seventh
Circuit held the NRAB had denied
the Brotherhood due process by
requiring evidence of conferencing
to be presented in the on-property
record, a requirement it said was
not clearly enunciated in the
statutes, regulations, or the collective bargaining agreement of the
parties. 522 F.3d 746 (7th Cir.
2008). The court observed that
decisions to admit or exclude evidence in an arbitration proceeding,
absent bad faith or error, are left
entirely to the discretion of the
arbitrator. The Seventh Circuit said
it would review claims of due
process violations, absent clear and
convincing evidence that Congress
intended to foreclose judicial
review.
The court explained that due
process requires the opportunity to
be heard at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner. According
to the Seventh Circuit, this means
that an arbitration tribunal may not
alter, without warning, the rules for
access to it. The Seventh Circuit
concluded the NRAB had denied the
Brotherhood due process and had
failed to act within the scope of its
jurisdiction by requiring as a prerequisite to arbitration proof of conferencing within the record of “onproperty” proceedings. The court
recognized that the RLA requires a
conference be held as a prerequisite
to arbitration. Because the proof
requirement was not clearly enunciated in statutes, regulations, or the
collective bargaining agreement,
however, the court said the NRAB
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created a new rule that was previously unknown and unapplied.
The court declared that an arbitration award made by the NRAB may
be overturned only if the reviewing
court is convinced the arbitrator
had not been trying to interpret the
collective bargaining, but instead
had resolved the parties’ disputes
according to the arbitrator’s private
notions of justice. When the NRAB
creates a new requirement on its
own, the court ruled, it is not interpreting the collective bargaining
agreement or following dictates of
RLA or its regulations, and such
changes in rules violate due process
rights of the parties.
Union Pacific’s petition for a
rehearing was denied. No judge in
regular service called for a vote on
the suggestion for a rehearing en
banc. 537 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2008)
(Easterbrook, C. J.; Posner, J. concurring specially). Union Pacific’s
subsequent request for review was
granted by the U.S. Supreme Court.
129 S. Ct. 1315 (2009).

CASE ANALYSIS
The RLA is a federal law governing
labor relations in the railway and
airline industries. Passed in 1926
and amended in 1936 to apply to
the airline industry, the RLA seeks
to substitute bargaining, arbitration,
and mediation for strikes as a
means of resolving labor disputes.
The National Railroad Adjustment
Board is a 34-member board established by Congress in 1934. The
NRAB is composed of persons
appointed by private representatives
of labor and management.
The NRAB consists of four separate
divisions covering various classes of
railroad employees. The relevant
division in this case, the First
Division, has jurisdiction over disputes involving engineers, firemen,
conductors, and other yard-service
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employees of train carriers. It has its
principal office in Chicago, Illinois.
The NRAB panels hearing cases in
the First Division consist of only five
persons—two railroad representatives and two union representatives,
and a referee or neutral member to
break a deadlock. While the individual panels are different from the
NRAB as a whole, they perform the
day-to-day work of the NRAB—
deciding disputes growing out of
grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements
concerning rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions. The RLA mandates that submission of a dispute to
the NRAB is the exclusive remedy
for these “minor disputes” regardless
of the parties’ preferences.
Grievance procedures for resolving
disputes between railroads and their
employees are regulated by the
RLA. Under the RLA, railroad
employees with grievances against
their employers must first attempt
to resolve those grievances through
an internal process before turning
to the courts. The procedure for dispute resolution is set forth in the
parties’ collective bargaining agreement and begins with investigations,
hearings, and appeals that take
place on the railroad property and
are generally referred to as “onproperty” proceedings. If one of the
parties is dissatisfied with the result,
the dispute is submitted to a conference. If the parties fail to resolve
their differences in conference, an
aggrieved party may initiate an arbitration proceeding before the NRAB.
In this case, Union Pacific argues
that the RLA’s provision governing
judicial review of NRAB decisions
could not be clearer. It declares that
under the RLA an order of the
NRAB may be set aside only for any
of three specified reasons. It says
there is no basis for review of due
process or any other issues not
encompassed within the three statutory grounds for judicial review.
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According to Union Pacific, the
Supreme Court construed the statutory language in Union Pacific R.R.
v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89 (1978), a
case in which Union Pacific says the
plaintiff was attempting to raise
extrastatutory due process objections. Union Pacific asserts the
Supreme Court squarely held that
NRAB decisions “may be set aside
only for the three reasons specified
therein. We have time and again
emphasized that this statutory language means just what it says.”
It is Union Pacific’s position that the
statutory and legislative histories
confirm this conclusion. It explains
that, prior to 1966, an employee
disappointed by an NRAB decision
received no judicial review whatsoever, but carriers could obtain a
new trial in court simply by refusing
to comply with a resulting award.
Union Pacific says Congress
responded to the perceived inequity
by providing that NRAB decisions
would be final and binding on both
sides, subject to a limited judicial
review provision.
Contending that the requirements
of due process are flexible and context specific, Union Pacific says that
respecting Congress’s obvious wishes here does not raise any serious
constitutional issues. It urges that
Congress’s judgment that the RLA
provides sufficient process on its
own terms is reasonable and entitled to respect. The railroad says
the RLA guarantees parties the fundamental requirements of due
process—including notice and an
opportunity to be heard before a
neutral decision maker—and judicial review of whether those
requirements have been satisfied. If,
Union Pacific argues, the result is
that parties are unable to pursue
novel theories of due process
beyond that guaranteed by the RLA,
that is appropriate in these limited
and unusual circumstances. It
(Continued on Page 60)

explains that Congress reasonably
patterned the grounds for review of
NRAB awards after the RLA’s judicial review provision for voluntary
arbitration. Union Pacific declares it
does not violate due process for parties to NRAB proceedings to be given basically the same procedural
protections, and the same grounds
for judicial review, that are enjoyed
by parties to employment arbitration in most other settings.
If the Supreme Court reaches the
merits of the Brotherhood’s due
process objections, Union Pacific
says, it still should reverse the
Seventh Circuit. It reasons that the
NRAB reasonably interpreted the
statute and its own rules to require
that the petitioner’s initial submission establish a fact essential to the
NRAB’s jurisdiction.
Union Pacific argues there was nothing unprecedented or unpredictable
about the NRAB’s holding. It points
out the RLA requires parties to supply the NRAB “with a full statement
of the facts and all supporting data
bearing upon the disputes.” 45
U.S.C. § 153, First (i). Claiming several prior decisions of the NRAB had
interpreted the rules this way, Union
Pacific asserts the Seventh Circuit
reasoning that those decisions were
not precedential would mean the
NRAB engages in unfair surprise
whenever it applies a general rule in
a manner that is ambiguous or
debatable by lawyers, even for the
hundredth time.
Moreover, the railroad contends,
even if this were the first time the
NRAB had addressed the issue, it
does not implicate due process for
the NRAB to resolve a debatable
issue and apply its resolution to the
parties at hand. Union Pacific
claims what the Brotherhood is
complaining about is just the ordinary retroactivity inherent in all
adjudication. According to Union

Pacific, the law has been built, for
centuries, around the premise (a fiction, perhaps, but a necessary one)
that courts simply declare what the
rules always were, and as a result
litigants cannot claim unfair surprise when a legal dispute is
resolved against them. It says the
same is true in agency adjudication
and in arbitration. Union Pacific
concludes the Brotherhood’s due
process theory would transform all
debatable questions into fodder for
constitutional litigation, rendering
the legal system utterly paralyzed
and unable to function.
The Brotherhood argues the
Seventh Circuit properly recognized
and exercised jurisdiction to review
the decision of the NRAB panel for
denial of procedural due process. It
says federal courts have exercised
this jurisdiction for over 50 years,
and before any provision for statutory review of NRAB actions under
the RLA. In the 1966 amendments
providing statutory review of NRAB
actions, the Brotherhood asserts,
Congress sought to expand and not
limit the preexisting review by the
federal courts under the Due
Process Clause. It says that the
jurisdiction for due process review
had been recognized by this Court
itself in Union Pacific R.R. v. Price,
360 U.S. 601 (1959).
According to the Brotherhood, there
is neither express language in the
1966 amendments nor any statement from a member of Congress
showing a “clear and convincing”
intent, or any intent, to strip or preclude the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. The Brotherhood acknowledges that in Union Pacific R.R. v.
Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89 (1978), the
Supreme Court restricted the use of
procedural due process to override
an NRAB panel’s application of a
specific collective bargaining agreement provision. However, the union
argues that Sheehan never found

60

due process was unavailable as a
ground of review. It also points out
that a majority of the circuits have
found no such congressional intent.
According to the union, the Seventh
Circuit properly exercised its jurisdiction and properly found that the
NRAB panel denied the Brotherhood
due process when it acted without
legal or statutory authority to
create a new rule requiring the
Brotherhood to submit evidence of
conferencing in its original submission—regardless of whether the fact
of conferencing was in dispute. The
Brotherhood says the Seventh
Circuit correctly held that the federal regulation on which the NRAB
panel purported to rely does not
even apply to evidence of conferencing and that the NRAB panel had
no authority to create such a rule.
The Brotherhood claims the NRAB
panel unlawfully invoked its own
“in-house” rule to dismiss the cases
of the five engineers without any
interpretation or decision of their
claims under the collective bargaining agreement. The union declares
that such denial of due process was
especially egregious when the
Brotherhood was provided with no
notice that conferencing was in dispute or that such evidence was
required when there had been no
objection to the lack of conferencing. The Brotherhood says Union
Pacific would not have been prejudiced by the consideration of the
evidence at this stage when Union
Pacific itself had previously failed to
object to the lack of conferencing in
a timely manner.
Finally, the Brotherhood says, it
challenged the dismissals for the failure of the NRAB panel to “confine or
conform” itself to its proper jurisdiction, as set out in 45 U.S.C. § 153,
First (q). The Brotherhood argues
that the NRAB panel unlawfully
exceeded its jurisdiction in applying
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a new procedural requirement that
had no basis in the RLA. According
to the union, the Seventh Circuit’s
finding that the NRAB panel acted
without legal authority in dismissing
these cases without resolution of the
contract claims supports finding this
statutory violation as well.

SIGNIFICANCE
In 1966, Section 3 of the RLA was
amended to include subparagraph
(q), permitting any party aggrieved
by an NRAB award to have it
reviewed on three grounds: (1) the
NRAB has failed to comply with the
requirements of the Act, (2) the
NRAB has failed to conform or confine itself to matters within the
scope of the board’s jurisdiction,
and (3) the NRAB or one of its
members has engaged in fraud or
corruption.
In Union Pacific R.R. v. Sheehan,
439 U.S. 89 (1978), the Supreme
Court held that judicial review of
NRAB orders is limited to these
three specific grounds. Since
Sheehan, the circuits have disagreed
whether the RLA allows a court to
set aside NRAB decisions on due
process grounds. Three circuits
have held that review of due process
arguments is forbidden. See United
Steelworkers v. Union R.R., 648
F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1981); Kinross v.
Utah Ry., 362 F.3d 658 (10th Cir.
2004); Henry v. Delta Air Lines, 759
F.2d 870 (11th Cir. 1985). See also
Jones v. Seaboard System R.R., 783
F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1986) (dictum).
Four other circuits have held that a
review of due process arguments is
not forbidden. See Shafi v. PLC
British Airways, 22 F.3d 59 (2d Cir.
1994); Locomotive Engineers v. St.
Louis Southwestern Ry., 757 F.2d
656 (5th Cir. 1985); Goff v. Dakota,
Minnesota & Eastern R.R., 276 F.3d
992 (8th Cir. 2002); Edelman v.
Western Airlines, Inc., 892 F.2d 839
(9th Cir. 1989).
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The question before the Supreme
Court is a narrow one pertaining to
only a relatively small number of
employees—railroad workers whose
claims are handled under Section 3
of the RLA. Unlike employees covered by the Labor Management
Relations Act and airline employees
who are exempt from Section 3 of
the RLA, employees of rail carriers
are subject to compulsory arbitration. This case gives the Supreme
Court an opportunity, however, to
resolve a conflict among the circuits
that goes back more than 23 years.

ATTORNEYS
PARTIES

FOR THE

For Petitioner Union Pacific
Railroad Co. (Maureen E. Mahoney,
202.637.2200)
For Respondent Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers and
Trainmen General Committee of
Adjustment, Central Region
(Thomas H. Geoghegan,
312.372.2511)

AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Petitioner Union
Pacific Railroad Co.
National Railway Labor
Conference Association of American
Railroads and Airline Industrial
Relations Conference (Peter
Buscemi, 202.739.3000)
In support of Respondent
Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers and Trainmen General
Committee of Adjustment, Central
Region
American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (James P. Coppess,
202.637.5337)
Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers and Trainmen, National
Division (Harold A. Ross,
216.241.2630)
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